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RECENT DECISIONS
Service of Process- Usual Place of Abode-A race horse
owner and his wife had sold their home in Amarillo, Texas, and
had maintained residence at a hotel in Raton, New Mexico, keeping
all of their personal property at the hotel. In June, 1952, they
took the race horses and moved to Denver, Colorado for the racing
season and rented a house where they lived with minor son, a married daughter and her husband. The son-in-law paid the rent. The wife
still picked up her mail in Raton and stored some of her personal
property in a warehouse there. Service of process was attempted upon
her on July 28, 1952, by leaving a copy of the process with her son at
the house in Denver. She left Denver without returning to the house
after this attempted service. Held: this was not her usual place of
abode and the summons and complaint had not been served. First National Bank and Trust Co. of Tulsa v. Ingerton, 207 F2d 793 (10th
Cir., 1953).
Rule 4(d) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that
service of process may be accomplished by leaving copies thereof at
"his dwelling house or usual place of abode." The problem arises in
the attempts that various courts have made in defining the term
"usual place of abode." There is considerable difference of opinion
as to an exact definition' and two of the United States Circuit
Courts of Appeal have stated that the state decisions on this question
are in "hopeless and irreconcilable conflict."' 2 No attempt will be made

to discuss the conflicting state views, but the writer will concern himself with the interpretation of this phrase 'by the various federal courts
and Wisconsin's position on the problem.
Prior to the instant case, there were only five federal cases construing this phrase.4 The McVeigh case 5 dealt with a state statute
stating that notice of a suit might be posted on the front door
of one's "usual place of abode" when neither the party nor his family
were present. There the Supreme Court held that the test of "usual
place of abode" is that the person against whom the notice is posted
should be living or have his home in that particular house, although he
'VOL. 43 WoRDs and PHRASZs, PEmM. ED., "Usual place of abode" 545, 72
CJ.S. Process §47.

2 First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Ingerton, 207 F 2d 793, (10th Cir., 1953)

and Rovinski v. Rowe, 131 F 2d 687 (6th Cir., 1942).
Civ. P. 4 (d) (1).
4 Earle v. McVeigh, 91 U.S. 503 (1876); Skidmore v. Green, 33 F. Supp. 529
(1940); Rovinski v. Rowe, 131 F. 2d 687 (6th Cir., 1942); McFadden v.
Shore, 60 F. Supp. 8 (1945); Leigh v. Lynton, 9 F.R.D. 28 (1949); U.S. v.
Chandler, 7 F.R.D. 365 (1947) followed the Skidmore case and held that
service by leaving a copy of the process at the family residence complied
with the federal rule when the defendant was being held in the penitentiary of another state at the time of service.
5Earle v. McVeigh, supra, n. 4.
3FED. R.
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may be temporarily absent. The basis of that ruling is that if the
house is his usual abode when he returns, the copy left will act as
notice. However, the court stated that the test is not the last place
of abode, for a person may change his place of abode every month in
the year. Only one's present residence is sufficient.6 The result of
the McVeigh case was that this attempted service was held void for the
parties attempting the service knew that the party, upon whom service
was attempted, had moved from that house with his entire family
six weeks previosuly.
Skidmore v. Green7 was the second major case on this problem. There service was attempted on the defendant, a retired policeman, who traveled around the country in an automobile and trailer
by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at his brother's home
in New York State. This was held to be service based on Rule 4(d)
(1) even though he did not reside there permanently because of several factors; namely, he had New York license plates, prior to 1937
he had lived in New York, he had listed his brother's home as his
address in his license application, and he had also stated he was a New
York resident when applying for license plates in South Carolina. The
court decided this case on those facts and stated as their rule that "he
does not reside there permanently but so far as the migratory nature
of his life permits of any place of abode or dwelling house, it is the
' 8
house in Kingston, New York.
The third case on this subject was Rovinski v. Rowe. 9 There the
defendant had worked in New York City for fourteen years and then
became an employee of the Department of Commerce working
throughout the United States. He had spent the last two years in
Duluth, Minnesota. His mother resided in Menominee, Michigan, and
it was there that service was attempted by leaving a copy of the
process at his "usual place of abode." The Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the District Court's ruling that this was effective service. The
District Judge had stated this rule:
"Taking all the circumstances in this case, I can see no surer
way of a person knowing he has been asked to come into court
to answer some complaint against him for damages than that
notice should be left at a place which has been throughout his
life the place of his legal residence, the place where his parents
lived, where his mother lives now. . .. "10
6 Although this case dealt with a Virginia statute authorizing the posting of

process on the usual place of abode, its discussion of "usual place of abode!
is applicable wherever that term is used and has been relied on as the basis
for the remaining cases mentioned in note 4.
7 Skidmore v. Green, supra, n. 4.
8 Ibid. at 530.
9 Rovinski v. Rowe, supra, n. 4.
10 Ibid. at 689. The circumstances were these; the defendant had always held
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This was summarized when the District Judge remarked that the question of service must be resolved by
"what best serves to give notice to a defendant that he is being
served with process, considering the situation from a practical
standpoint."11
The McFadden case'2 also deals with this problem but confines itself to the "usual place of abode" of soldiers and sailors. This District Court decision follows the weight of authority in ruling that military service is temporary and that where temporary residence is
established away from the usual residence, the place of abode is the
usual residence, not the temporary residence. However, some courts
have ruled otherwise, but those decisions ar usually based on a manifested intent not to return to the former residence.' 3 The Soldiers'
and Sailors' Relief Act has no application to service. 14
The most recent case outside of the instant case on this question
was Leigh v. Lynton.51 There the defendant had gone back to Great
Britain in August 1948, and had not returned to the United States.
After his departure, his wife and another woman rented an apartment
in the Wyndham Hotel where they resided until October, 1948. On
September 20, 1948, service on the defendant was attempted by leaving
a copy at the hotel. The District Court held this was not his usual
place of abode under Rule 4(d) (1).16
As to the above mentioned cases, the instant case 7 places much
emphasis on the McVeigh case'" and the Shore case'" and derives the
rule that "where temporary residence is established away from the
normal or usual residence, the 'place of abode' is the usual residence
regardless of the temporary residence." 20 In applying that rule to the
facts, the court concludes that the residence in Denver was only a
temporary arrangement and since they continued to receive their mail
and had some belongings in the hotel in Raton, that was their usual
place of abode.
that place as his home, he had a telephone listed there in his own name, he
had clothing and a room ready for his occupancy at all times, and he had
never voted except as a citizen of Michigan.

1 Supra, n. 9 at 689.
"2 McFadden v. Shore, supra, n. 4. See also, 158 A.L.R. 1450.
23 Eckman v. Grear, 14 N.J. Misc. 807, 187 A 556 (1936). But see Kurilla v.
Roth, 132 N.J.L. 213, 38 A 2d 862 (1944) where the opposite result is reached
under similar facts. VOL. 43 WORDS and PHRASES, PERU. ED. "Usual Place,
of Abode," 547 (Supp. p. 145).
'14 Soldiers' & Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940; 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix §510 et
seq.; supra, n. 12.
15Leigh v. Lynton, 9 F.R.D. 28 (1949).

'16Supra,
n. 3.
27 Supra, n. 2.
's Supra, n. 5.
190 Supra, n. 12.
2 Supra, n. 2 at 795.
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The dissenting judge points out that most courts agree that the
usual place of abode is where a person is living at the particular time
that service is made. 21 Since the defendant had a migratory life, the
facts of her life are the deciding factors. That judge based his opinion
on the fact that the wife and husband traveled wherever his horses
were to run; that the defendant had not returned to the hotel in Raton
for even one night, but had had her belongings turned over to a storage company and concluded that there was nothing in the record to
show that the defendant's usual place of abode was anywhere but at
her temporary residence since:
"cas race owners, the Ingerton's usual place of abode was whereever their horses happened to be running..., at the particular
time it was Denver."
The Ingerton case can be factually differentiated from several of
these cases. For example, in the Skidmore case 23 there were several
factors which led the court to its conclusion that the defendant held
that place out as his residence. In the Rovinski case, 24 the facts that
the defendant had left many of his personal belongings at his mother's
home, that there was a room at all times ready for his occupancy,
and that he had always voted as a Michigan resident form the basis
for that decision. But in the Ingerton case 25 the only factors present
were that they picked up their mail at Raton and that they paid rent
on a room and kept personal belongings at the hotel. Yet that was
held sufficient by the majority.
The problem as to this rule is whether it is to be construed liberally or strictly. On this point, there is a split of authority. The one
group holds that since this type of substituted service is purely statutory, the statute must be followed "strictly, faithfully, fully, literally."
But the Rovinski v. Rowe case held that these rules for service should
be construed liberally to effectuate service where actual notice of the
suit has been received by the defendant. 2 7This doctrine is confined by
two more recent decisions 28 but not so as to make it inapplicable to
the Inrgerton case. However, since there was no proof that actual notice
had reached the defendant in that case, it could not be applied.
The Wisconsin rulings on the question of usual place of abode
are few. An early case, Healey v. Butter,29 adopted the rule that
21

Supra, n. 2 citing State ex. rel. Merritt v. Hefferman, 142 Fla. 496, 195 So.
145, (1939).
22Supra,
n. 2 at 796.
2
sSupra, n. 7.
24 Supra, n. 9.

25

Supra, n. 2.

26 72

27

C.J.S. Process §43.

Supra, n. 9.
Blain v. Young, 10 F.R.D. 109 (1950)

28
29

(1951).

and Berner v. Farney, 11 F.R.D. 508

Healey v. Butter, 66 Wis. 9, 27 N.W. 822 (1886).
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man's last and usual place of abode is his present usual place of abode.
This ruling was assailed in a federal court case30 but never expressly
overruled. Then in the Caskey v. Peterson case, 31 the court held that
the usual place of abode of an emancipated boy who was working on
and living at a farm away from his parents was at the farm and not
32
at his present home. This decision interpreted the Wisconsin statute
on substituted service and seemed to follow the Earle v. McVeigh rule33
that the usual place of abode is the place where the defendant is usually
and actually living. However, Wisconsin rulings 43 differ from the Rowe
case rulings 35 in that Wisconsin has held that all statutes on substituted service should be strictly construed.
The writer believes that the Ingerton case is an unnecessary enlargement of the temporary residence doctrine of earlier federal court
cases. While its doctrine of liberal construction is not available under
the facts in the Ingerton case as such, the policy of the decision of the
Rowe case and the reasoning of the dissenting judge appear to this
writer to be the sounder view on this problem and would be more in
keeping with the other federal decisions on this question.,
DONALD GRIFFIN, JR.
Property-Commission for Sale of Farm after Listing Contract

Has Expired-The plaintiff, Butterworth, an agefit for the United
Farm Agency, in pursuance of his listing agreement for the property,
offered to lease the farm for a year with an option to buy during the
year. This arrangement was acceptable to defendants and plaintiff
ceased all efforts to find a purchaser. Five months after the brokerage
contract expired, but during the life of the option, Mrs. Harrison persuaded one Vanadore to exercise his option and purchase the farm at
the original price of $12,500. Agent now sues for his 10% commission.
HELD: the defendants, by executing a sales contract with Vanadore
(the purchaser produced by plaintiff) before the lease option contract
had expired, in effect agreed to an extension of the listing agreement
since it is clear that the lease option contract was a direct result of the
listing agreement which Mrs. Harrison signed. justice McFadden in
his dissent claims that the broker is not entitled to any commission in
this case because: (a) the sale was not made within the time stated
30

Swift v. Meyers, 37 Fed. 37 (1888).

31 Cashey v. Peterson, 220 Wis. 690, 263 N.W. 658 (1935).
32

WIs. STATS.
33 Supra, n. 4.

(1951)

§262.08 (4).

4 Pollard v. Wegener, 13 Wis. *569 (1860),

Mechlem v. Blake, 19 Wis. *397
(1865).
5 Supra, n. 9.
36 But see; Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) and
34 MARQ. L. REv. 120.
3

